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P.: Constructive Trusts--Acquisition of Property by Murderer--Tenancy

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS-AcQuismoN OF PROPERTY BY M
ERmu
-TFN cy BY T= ENTm=r.-H and W, husband and wife, held

real estate as tenants by the entireties. H shot and killed W, and
then took his own life. W's heirs bring action to determine title to
the property. By statute anyone convicted of intentionally killing
another person becomes a constructive trustee of any property he
may acquire from the decedent for the sole benefit of decedent's
heirs. Held, affirming judgment for H's heirs, that each spouse held
the entire estate from the time of the original investiture, and H
acquired no new interest on the death of W due to the legal fiction
of unity created by marriage. The court also found that the pertinent statute was not applicable for there was no conviction as required by the legislature. Dissent pointed out that by permitting
H's heirs to take title, the majority opinion allowed H to benefit by
his crime; and that the factual situation presented here is not
provided for by the statute, for there was no opportunity to indict
and try H. National City Bank v. Bledsoe, 133 N.E.2d 887 (Ind.
1956).
Can a murderer acquire property as a result of his crime? This
question has so perplexed our courts, that there have been many
divergent decisions in attempting to reach an equitable solution concerning property held as tenants by the entireties. The different views
are as follows: (1) All rights to the property pass to the victim's
heirs. Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup.
Ct. 1918). (2) The entire property is in the murderous spouse.
Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108
(1908). (3) One-half is given to the victim's estate, the other onehalf to the murderer's estate. Cowan v. Pleasant,263 S.W.2d 494
(Ky. 1953). (4) "The legal title passes to the murderer, but equity
will treat him as a constructive trustee of the title because of the
unconscionable mode of its acquisition, and compel him to convey
it to the heirs of the deceased, exclusive of the murderer." AmEs,
LECTURES ON LEGAL HIsTORY 310, 311 (1913).
However even the
courts that follow this theory are divided as to what size estate the
beneficiary of the trust receives. In Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App.
913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930), the property was treated as if held by
tenants in common and a constructive trust was created for onehalf. (It should be noted that the plaintiff only petitioned for onehalf.) In a leading case, a North Carolina court held the victim's
heirs beneficiaries of the entire property subject to a life estate in
the wrongdoer. (In the statement of facts the court notes that the
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victim had a greater life expectancy.) Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C.
372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927). Mortality tables were used to give the
heirs of the victim a life estate in one-half of the property because
the murderer had a greater life expectancy than the decedent. Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 Ati. 517 (1933). In Neiman
v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 45 (1952), the court presumed the
victim would have survived the wrongdoer so that the decedents
heirs received a one-half interest in the property outright and a
remainder in the other one-half interest, it being subject to the
murderer's life estate.
The confusion in results stems from the conflict originating
back when the common law courts were entirely distinct from the
equity courts. From the law courts came the ancient legal fiction
of unity of husband and wife, while from equity came the maxim
that "no one shall be permitted to profit by his own wrong." Also
there is the problem brought about by the fact that the wrongdoer
in effect does receive a practical benefit in that before the murder
he had to share the property with his fellow tenant and there was
the possibility of loss of the remainder if his cotenant outlived him.
After the wrongful act he has complete possession and there is no
possibility of losing any interest. The difficulty in using this argument is due to a common constitutional provision such as in West
Virginia that "no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate", W. VA. CoNsr. art. 3, §18, and to a conception
that to deprive the survivor of the property would violate this provision.
The constructive trust theory appears to be the superior solution. The wrongdoer is not deprived of any property in contravention to either the legal principle of unity through marriage or
the constitutional provision against forfeiture, yet the equity maxim
is followed and he receives no property as a result of his wrong.
Fortunately the West Virginia court will not be faced with the argument provided by the legal fiction of unity of husband and wife due
to W. VA. CODE C. 36, art. 1, §19 (Michie 1955), which has been construed in McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616,44 S.E. 508
(1903), to say that tenancies by the entireties no longer exist in West
Virginia and that now they are to be considered as joint tenancies.
However the Indiana court employed the absence of a conviction, as required by statute before a constructive trust can be en-
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forced, to deny relief. Our courts may have to answer a similar
argument due to a local statute which provides: "No person who
has been convicted of feloniously killing another ... shall take or

acquire any money or property... from the one killed... either
by descent and distribution or by will or by insurance... or otherwise." W. VA. CODE c. 42, art. 4, §2 (Michie 1955).
The dissent pointed out that there was no opportunity to convict
due to the immediate suicide so that Indiana "has no statute applicable to [the] situation presented here." This gives the court the
opportunity to rely upon general equitable principles to find a constructive trust without any legislative aid. National City Bank v.
Bledsoe, supra at 895. See Colson, Constructive Trusts in West Virginia, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 357, 364 (1939). As Professor Landis suggests if the statute doesn't literally apply the court should ask the
question: Does the policy behind the statute cover this situation?
Once the basic purpose is discovered it is up to the court to expand
and give effect to the statute beyond the express terms. Landis,
Statutes and the Sources of Law, HAnvAIU LEGAL EssAYs 213 (1934).
See MetropolitanLife Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. VA. 515, 177 S.E. 188
(1934). Using this approach to statutory interpretation it would not
be difficult to find a constructive trust with or without a conviction.
M. J. P.
LANDLoRD AND TEarr-AssiGNmENT oR SUBaL.sE.-By two
leases executed on different dates, A leased to B all the coal in two
seams underlying certain West Virginia and Virginia land for terms
of twelve years with options to renew for like periods until the coal
was exhausted. The lessee was given the right to remove all tipples,
machinery and other personal property within six months after
termination of the leases, otherwise than by forfeiture. B assigned
all his rights under the leases to C who opened a mine on the premises. Subsequently, C transferred to D the right to operate the mine

and also the right to use the tipple, machinery and equipment belonging to C. The agreement was to remain in effect until the coal
was exhausted. Upon termination of the leases, D was to surrender
the premises together with the equipment and machinery to C. After
the tipple was destroyed by fire, all mining operations ceased and
the equipment was removed. D attempted to exercise the option
to renew one of the leases, but A denied his right to do so and
brought suit for surrender of the premises and for an injunction to
restrain D from mining coal from the property. Held, that D was
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